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1. Introduction
Variation in relative factor prices across labor markets is inuential in determin-
ing workerssusceptibility to international trade shocks, regional income convergence
and the spatial location of industries. Persistence in relative factor reward varia-
tion over time also sheds light on the degree to which factor mobility is su¢ cient
to arbitrage away wage gaps. This paper develops a methodology for identifying
relative factor price di¤erences across regions and uses it to test whether relative
skilled wages are equal in the United States181 labor markets.
Identifying relative factor price equality is a di¢ cult problem for two reasons.
First, any methodology must account for the possibility that factors vary in terms
of unobservable quality or composition across labor markets. Regions with superior
educational systems or worker training programs, for example, might possess higher-
productivity skilled workers than regions without these attributes, thereby inducing
higher observed relative skilled wages even if quality-adjusted skill premia are equal.
Second, a useful methodology must correctly identify failures of relative factor price
inequality in the face of variation in market structure across industries and regions.
Such variation in market structure is di¢ cult for econometricians to discern.
Tests of relative factor price inequality across countries are common in the in-
ternational trade literature.1 However, the scarcity of internationally comparable
wage data has motivated the creation of tests that verify the implications of relative
wage variation (e.g. production specialization) rather than di¤erences in relative
wages directly.2 The outcomes of these tests suggest signicant relative factor price
di¤erences across developed and developing economies. This paper focuses on rel-
ative factor price equality within a single country, which is generally thought to be
more likely.
In contrast with the international trade literature, we develop a methodology
for identifying departures from relative factor price equality that is based upon
general optimality conditions for producer equilibrium. This methodology possesses
a number of important advantages over traditional methods. First, it is valid under
1Empirical tests of factor price equality across countries include Treer (1993), Repetto and
Ventura (1998), Davis and Weinstein (2001), Cunat (2000), Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) and
Schott (2003). Tests for factor price equality within countries include Davis et al. (1997) and De-
baere (2004) who study prefectures in Japan, Debaere (2004) who examines administrative regions
in the United Kingdom, and Hanson and Slaughter (2002) who analyze U.S. states.
2Theoretical conditions necessary for factor price equality have been explored by Samuelson
(1949), McKenzie (1955), Dixit and Norman (1980), Wu (1987), Courant and Deardor¤ (1994) and
Deardor¤ (1994).
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a wide range of assumptions regarding production, markets and factors, including
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. Second, because it makes
no assumptions about the preferences and costs of living faced by di¤erent groups
of workers, it is robust to unobserved variation in consumer price indices specic
to locations. Third, it controls for a variety of measurement issues that can cause
observed factor prices to vary even if true, unobserved factor prices are identical, in
particular region-factor-industry variation in the quality or composition of factors.
Finally, it is easy to implement and can be used in a variety of contexts. The only
data required are total payments to factors by industry and region.
Application of our methodology to the United States reveals several surprising
facts about the geographic variation of quality-adjusted relative skilled wages in
manufacturing over time. We nd that the United States181 labor markets exhibit
statistically signicant and economically meaningful di¤erences in non-production
worker wages relative to production worker wages in both 1972 and 1992. In 1972,
for example, the quality-adjusted skill premium was 30 percent higher in Nashville
than in New York City. By 1992, this di¤erential had risen to 36 percent. Overall,
labor markets exhibit increasing relative-wage polarization: dividing U.S. labor
markets into three groups according to the signicance of their relative skilled wage
di¤erences in both years, we nd that the number of labor markets in the middle
declines with time as the two groups at either end expand.
The economic importance of these relative wage di¤erences is signalled by their
strong relationship to labor marketsindustry structure. In cross-section, we nd
that the larger the di¤erence in two labor marketsrelative skilled wages, the smaller
the number of industries they produce in common. Within labor markets across
time, we nd that greater changes in relative skilled wages are associated with a
larger number of added and dropped industries: as labor markets skill premia
evolve, their industry mix adapts.
Neoclassical trade theory provides a useful intuition for these trends. In that
framework, su¢ cient heterogeneity of regional factor endowments combined with
factor immobility across regions can give rise to an equilibrium in which regions
o¤er di¤erent relative factor prices and attract di¤erent sets of industries: skill-
scarce Nashville o¤ers a high skill premium and attracts skill-scarce industries, skill-
abundant New York City o¤ers a low skill premium and attracts skill-intensive
industries, and too few workers move between New York and Nashville to bid these
relative wage di¤erences away.3 Though the assumption of labor immobility upon
3 In the neoclassical model, this outcome is referred to as a multiple cone equilibrium. See, for
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which this equilibrium depends is strong, it is not without independent empirical
support.4
Variation in labor marketsindustry participation is noteworthy because it im-
plies potential asymmetric exposure of otherwise identical U.S. workers to domes-
tic and international shocks. In particular, it may insulate unskilled workers in
skill-intensive regions from the well-known distributional consequences of trade lib-
eralization implied by the factor proportions framework. Because skill-scarce labor
markets are more likely to produce goods in common with labor-abundant trading
partners like Mexico and China, the real wages of unskilled workers in these regions
may respond more readily and negatively to the price declines associated with
falling trade costs. Our ndings suggest that standard implications of international
trade theory may apply within as well as across nations.
Relative factor price inequality is also informative about the possibility of re-
gional income convergence within countries. Research in the macroeconomic liter-
ature, for example, has found sluggish equilibration of relative per worker income
levels across U.S. regions over time.5 Those ndings suggest that either relative
factor endowments or relative factor prices are at best converging slowly. Our
demonstration of persistent and increasing relative wage disparities provides evi-
dence of the importance of factor prices, while our use of local labor market areas
gives a much higher level of spatial resolution than is typical in the literature.
An alternate interpretation of our results is that they are driven by unobserved
variation in the relative cost of living across factors and regions. This explanation,
in contrast to the neoclassical model, is consistent with perfect labor mobility: if the
consumer price index for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers were lower in
skill-abundant regions, real relative consumption wages could be equal across labor
markets even if nominal relative wages were not. In that case workers would have no
incentive to relocate, but production specialization and asymmetric susceptibility
of U.S. workers to macroeconomic shocks would still occur as industry location
depends upon nominal rather than real relative wage di¤erences.6 Though this
explanation does not rely on labor immobility, it does depend upon enduring, and
in some cases increasing, di¤erences in factor-region specic costs of living across the
example, Leamer (1987).
4Bound and Holzer (2000), for example, nd that imperfect mobility of unskilled workers in the
United States contributed toward increased income inequality in the 1980s.
5See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Carlino and Mills (1993).
6 In another contrast with the neoclassical interpretation, this explanation suggests asymmetric
shocks will be more readily transmitted across regions via factor mobility.
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United States. Because such di¤erences are also in principle subject to arbitrage,
the reasons for this persistence are not obvious.
Our methodology and results contribute to the large literature on U.S. income
inequality. A number of papers have demonstrated that U.S. skill premia have
risen precipitously over the past few decades.7 These studies generally document
trends either for the U.S. as a whole or for relatively aggregate regions or states
within the United States.8 Our examination here of di¤erences in relative wages
across the full set of U.S. labor markets is, to our knowledge, unique. It suggests
that previously observed increases in aggregate U.S. income inequality may obscure
important regional heterogeneity that could be exploited to determine its ultimate
cause.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the relevant propositions on
relative factor price equality and develops their testable implications. In Section
3, we outline our empirical methodology. Section 4 provides an overview of U.S.
regional variation and presents results for our test of relative factor price equality in
1972 and 1992. Section 5 o¤ers evidence on the relation between industry structure
and factor prices. Section 6 discusses possible explanations for our ndings and
Section 7 concludes.
2. Relative Factor Price Equality
Factor price equality can be either absolute or relative. If absolute factor price
equality holds (AFPE), regions must have identical nominal factor rewards for iden-
tical quality-adjusted factors at a point in time. If relative factor price equal-
ity holds (RFPE), regions must have identical relative factor rewards for identical
quality-adjusted factors even though absolute factor prices may di¤er.
We devote our theoretical and empirical attention in this paper to a test of
relative factor price equality for three reasons. First, there is a natural and rich
link between variation in regionsrelative factor prices and their industry structure,
e.g., skill-intensive industries have an incentive to locate in skill-abundant regions.
Second, as we demonstrate below, testing for relative factor price equality, unlike
absolute factor price equality, is robust to potential variation in production tech-
nologies across regions and industries. Finally, a test of relative factor price equality
7See, for example, Katz and Murphy (1992) and Juhn et al. (1993).
8Topel (1994), for example, documents a rise in U.S. income inequality across nine U.S. Census
regions. An exception is Bound and Holzer (2000), which examines relative wage trends within
U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).
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is more stringent in the sense that relative factor prices can be equal even if absolute
factor price equality fails. Nevertheless, for interested readers we provide in an
Appendix a complementary test for absolute factor price equality.
Our method for identifying departures from factor price equality emphasizes the
importance of potential unobserved variation in region-industry-factor quality that
can bias traditional wage comparisons. We demonstrate how total payments to
each factor, i.e., wagebills, can be exploited to control for this unobserved variation.
2.1. Basic Setting
Let
Yrj = ArjFj (Srj ; Urj ;Krj) ; (1)
be a value-added production function for industry j and region r, where Arj is
a Hicks-neutral productivity shifter that allows technology to vary across regions
and industries and Srj , Urj , and Krj are quality-adjusted inputs of skilled workers,
unskilled workers, and capital, respectively. Individual factors enter production
through the function Fj which varies across industries but is the same across regions
within an industry. Firms in region r and industry j choose factor usage to minimize
costs,
min
Srj ;Urj ;Krj
wSr Srj + w
U
r Urj + w
K
r Krj (2)
such that ArjFj (Srj ; Urj ;Krj) = Yrj
which denes the total cost function,
Brj = A
 1
rj  j(w
S
r ; w
U
r ; w
K
r )Yrj : (3)
In this specication, rms may act either as price-takers in product markets
(perfect competition; this section) or choose prices subject to a downward sloping
demand curve (imperfect competition; next section). Here we begin by assuming
constant returns to scale; later we extend the analysis to allow for internal and
external increasing returns to scale. In factor markets, we assume that rms choose
employment taking factor prices as given.9 Though we write down the model with
9The analysis is consistent with both competitive factor markets and right to managemod-
els of union behavior, where rms and unions bargain over wages within an industry but rms
choose employment (see, for example, Farber 1986 and Layard et al. 1991). For clarity of expo-
sition, we focus on the competitive case in the text, where wages are equalized across industries.
With industry-specic bargaining, wages will generally vary across industries. Inter-industry wage
di¤erentials are consistent with our approach, which only exploits variation across regions within
industries. We return to discuss this point further in the empirical section below.
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three factors of production, the analysis can be extended to an arbitrary number of
industries or factors.
Let a tilde (~) signify observed quantities that have not been adjusted for quality,
and let zrj denote a quality adjustor for industry j, region r and factor z. Note that
zrj allows for unobserved variation in quality that is specic to factors, regions and
industries. The quality-adjusted employment level and wage of factor z 2 (S;U;K)
in region r equals the observed variable scaled by the quality adjuster, i.e.
zrj = 
z
rjezrj and wzrj = ewzrj=zrj : (4)
Without loss of generality, assume there are two regions, r and b, where region b is
the reference region whose factors are taken to be the baseline quality benchmarks,
i.e. zbj = 1.
The demand for quality-adjusted factor z may be obtained using Shephards
Lemma,
zrj = A
 1
rj Yrj
@ j()
@wzr
: (5)
Dividing one rst-order condition by another provides an expression for the relative
demand for any two quality-adjusted factors of production. The relative demand
for skilled workers in terms of unskilled workers is
Srj
Urj
=
@ j()=@wSr
@ j()=@wUr
: (6)
Notice that terms in region-industry productivity, Arj , do not appear in equation
(6) as the direct e¤ect of variation in technology on the marginal revenue product
is identical for each factor. Similarly, region-industry variation in relative goods
prices has symmetric direct e¤ects on the marginal revenue product of every factor
and thus does not a¤ect the relative factor demands.10 Using the relationship be-
tween quality-adjusted and observed values in (4), this implies the following relative
demand for observed factors of production,eSrjeUrj = 
U
rj
Srj
@ j()=@wSr
@ j()=@wUr
: (7)
10 In general equilibrium, variation in goods prices or technologies across regions and industries
can cause variation in relative factor prices; see Section 6 for further detail. Our test correctly
rejects relative factor price equality in such cases.
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Under the null of relative factor price equality, quality-adjusted relative wages
and factor usage across regions r and b must be equal11,
(H0: RFPE)
wSr
wUr
=
wSb
wUb
and
Sr
Ur
=
Sb
Ub
; (8)
where the second equation follows directly from equation (6).12
Observed relative wages and observed factor usage in the two regions, under the
null of RFPE, are given by
~wSr
~wUr
=
Srj
Urj
~wSb
~wUb
and
eSrjeUrj =
eSbj=SrjeUbj=Urj : (9)
These relationships demonstrate the di¢ culty of using either observed relative wages
or observed factor usages to test for factor price equality: even under the null hypoth-
esis of RFPE, observed relative wages and observed usages can vary across regions
within industries if there are di¤erences in unobserved factor quality (i.e. Srj 6= 1
or Urj 6= 1).13 We solve this problem by combining observed wages and employ-
ment into wagebills, where the wagebill for factor z is equal to wzrjzrj

= ewzrjezrj.
As is evident from equation (9), multiplying wages and employment causes region-
industry-factor quality adjustors to drop out. As a result, observed relative wage-
bills, which are generally available to empirical researchers, are equal under the null
hypothesis of relative factor price equality,
(H0: RFPE)
w^agebill
S
rj
w^agebill
U
rj
=
w^agebill
S
bj
w^agebill
U
bj
: (10)
If RFPE does not hold, the quality-adjusted relative wS=wU wage di¤ers across
regions r and b by a multiplicative factor, SUrb ,
(H1: No RFPE)
wSr
wUr
= SUrb
wSb
wUb
(11)
11RFPE holds if the quality-adjusted relative wages are equal for any M   1 of the M factors of
production.
12Homogeneity of degree one of the cost function implies that the derivatives @ j=@w'r are ho-
mogenous of degree zero in factor prices. It follows immediately from equation (6) that, with
identical quality-adjusted relative factor prices, regions will employ quality-adjusted factors of pro-
duction in the same proportions.
13As the factor quality of the base region has been normalized to equal one, 'bj = 1, 
'
rj 6= 1
indicates that factor quality di¤ers in industry j between the base region and region r.
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Here, again, we let region b be the benchmark region, so that SUrb = 
SU
r =
SU
b , where
SUb = 1. Across regions, observed relative wages now vary because of di¤erences
in factor quality and because of variation in true wages,
~wSr
~wUr
= SUrb
Srj
Urj
~wSb
~wUb
: (12)
With quality-adjusted relative wage di¤erences across regions, observed factor usage
also varies because of di¤erences both in factor quality and in factor demand driven
by relative wage di¤erences,eSrjeUrj = 
S
rj
Urj

@ j()=@wSr
@ j()=@wUr

@ j()=@wSb
@ j()=@wUb
 eSbjeUbj : (13)
Multiplying the expressions for observed relative factor prices and observed relative
employments (equations 12 and 13), the terms in unobserved factor quality again
cancel. Under the alternate hypothesis of no RFPE, relative wagebills vary across
regions because of di¤erences in factor prices and variation in factor usage,
(H1: No RFPE)
w^agebill
S
rj
w^agebill
U
rj
= SUrbj
w^agebill
S
bj
w^agebill
U
bj
; (14)
where
SUrbj = 
SU
rb

@ j()=@wSr
@ j()=@wUr

@ j()=@wUb
@ j()=@wSb

: (15)
If RFPE fails, there are two e¤ects on the relative wagebill for an industry across
regions. The rst is given in equation (15) directly by the di¤erence in relative
wages, SUrb . The second e¤ect, inside the brackets, is due to di¤erences in relative
factor usage caused by the variation in relative wages, and thus is also a function
of SUrb . For example, if the region-industry production function is CES with j =
1=(1  j) as the elasticity of substitution between factors, then,
SUrbj = 
SU
rb
h 
SUrb
1=(j 1)i =  SUrb j=(j 1) : (16)
Such an assumption about the form of the production function enables the researcher
to recover the underlying relative wage di¤erence, SUrb , from the estimates of 
SU
rbj .
Together equations (10) and (14) provide the basis for a test of the null hy-
pothesis of RFPE that is robust to unobserved region-industry variation in factor
quality. The intuition underlying this methodology is that, although the empirical
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researcher cannot observe factor quality or quality-adjusted factor prices, observed
factor prices contain information about the quality of observed factors when rms
minimize costs. Multiplying observed factor prices by observed factor quantities
enables us to control for unobserved variation in factor quality.
In our empirical work below, we test whether SUrbj = 1 across regions. RFPE
asserts all relative factor prices are equal. A rejection of relative factor price equality
for any pair of factors, e.g. skilled and unskilled labor, is su¢ cient to reject the null
hypothesis of RFPE.14
We caution that SUrbj 6= 1 is su¢ cient to reject RFPE, but not necessary. Under
CES production, for example, even if SUrb 6= 1 so that quality-adjusted relative
wages are not equalized, the parameter SUrbj =
 
SUrb
j=(j 1) equals unity for the
special case of a Cobb-Douglas cost function (j = 0). In the implementation of
our methodology below, we test the null hypothesis SUrbj = 1 and, in so far as this
hypothesis is rejected, this result is su¢ cient for us to reject RFPE. Under CES,
the fact that
 
SUrb
j=(j 1) is close to 1 for j close to 0 actually makes it harder for
us to reject the null hypothesis and strengthens any nding of a rejection of RFPE.
In the remainder of this section, we demonstrate the robustness of the relative
wagebill test to the existence of imperfect competition, to production exhibiting
increasing returns to scale, and to di¤erences in factor composition.
2.2. Imperfect Competition
If rms maximize prots subject to a downward sloping inverse demand curve,
vrj(Yrj); under conditions of imperfect competition, the rst-order condition for
prot-maximization is
dvrj(Yrj)
dYrj
Yrj + vrj(Yrj)   j()
Arj
= 0: (17)
Dening the elasticity of demand as "rj(Yrj)   (dYrj=dvrj)vrj=Yrj where vrj de-
notes price, we obtain the standard result that equilibrium price is a mark-up over
marginal cost,
vrj(Yrj) =

"rj(Yrj)
"rj(Yrj)  1

 j()
Arj
: (18)
By Shephards Lemma, equilibrium demand for each quality-adjusted factor of pro-
duction continues to be given by the derivative of the total cost function with respect
14With perfect capital mobility, the rate of return to capital may be equalized across regions.
However, as long as there is a degree of immobility for at least one other factor of production,
quality-adjusted relative factor prices will generally vary.
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to the factor price as specied in equation (5). The derivation of the test for relative
factor price equalization is thus identical to that provided above.
2.3. External Economies of Scale
It is straightforward to introduce external economies of scale into the framework
above in either perfectly or imperfectly competitive market structures. External
economies of scale correspond to the assumption that technical e¢ ciency in a region-
industry is a function of scale. In the most general case, we have,
Arj = Arj(Yrj ; Yr; j ; Y r;j ; Y r; j) (19)
where Yr; j is the vector of outputs in all other industries in a region, Y r;j is
the vector of all other regionsoutputs in the industry, and Y r; j is the vector of
all other regionsoutputs in all other industries. Because the cost-minimization
behavior of the rm is the same (see equation 2), the derivation of the test for
relative factor price equality remains unchanged.
2.4. Internal Economies of Scale
Internal economies of scale must clearly be combined with imperfect competition
and imply that the cost function (3) is no longer linearly homogenous of degree one
in output. Equilibrium price continues to be a mark-up over marginal cost,
v(Y ) =

"(Y )
"(Y )  1

1
Arj
@ j(w
U
r ; w
S
r ; w
K
r ; Y )
@Y
: (20)
Equilibrium demand for quality-adjusted factors of production may again be ob-
tained using Shephards Lemma. Using the relationship between quality-adjusted
and non quality-adjusted values, relative demand for observed skilled and unskilled
workers will be given by,
eSeU = 
U
rj
Srj
@ j(w
S
r ; w
U
r ; w
K
r ; Y )=@w
S
r
@ j(wSr ; w
U
r ; w
K
r ; Y )=@w
U
r
: (21)
Multiplying the expressions for observed relative factor prices and observed relative
employments, the terms in unobserved factor quality again cancel. The expression
for relative wagebills becomes,
w^agebill
S
rj
w^agebill
U
rj
= SUrb

@ j()=@wSr
@ j()=@wUr

@ j()=@wUb
@ j()=@wSb

w^agebill
S
bj
w^agebill
U
bj
(22)
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where the terms in brackets capturing relative unit factor input requirements are
now a function of output, Y .
In the standard case of trade under internal economies of scale in the theoretical
literature, rms within an industry face the same constant elasticity of substitu-
tion "j , cost functions are homothetic and identical within industries, and there is
free entry so that price equals average cost. Combining free entry with the pricing
relationship in (20), the equilibrium ratio of average to marginal cost will equal a
constant "j=("j   1), which with homothetic cost functions denes a unique equilib-
rium value of output for all rms in the industry.
Under the null hypothesis of relative factor price equalization, SUrb = 1, and with
all rms in the industry facing the same factor prices and producing the same output,
the terms in parentheses in (22) cancel, so that we again obtain the prediction that
relative wagebills are equalized under the null.15
More generally, in the presence of internal economies of scale, variation in rm
size across regions and industries may inuence factor demand and lead in general
equilibrium to a violation of relative factor price equality.16
2.5. Factor Quality and Factor Composition
Our methodology for uncovering a failure of relative factor price equality is ro-
bust to region-industry variation in the mix of factors used within factor groups,
e.g. variation in the relative use of skilled managers versus skilled engineers within
the skilled worker factor group.17 We assume that the production technology is
weakly separable in skilled and unskilled workers, so that rms rst choose opti-
mal quantities of skilled and unskilled workers before choosing optimal amounts
of worker types within these categories. We demonstrate the point formally for
skilled workers, but, without loss of generality, the argument applies for any factor
of production. Though, for simplicity, we consider two types of skilled workers, the
15Helpman and Krugman (1985) provide an analysis of theoretical models of monopolistic com-
petition and increasing returns to scale with factor price equalization.
16We revisit the implications of internal increasing returns to scale in discussing the empirical
results in Section 6.4.
17Our methodology also accounts for the misclassication of workers across factor categories if
the misclassication is either random or occurs systematically along industry lines. However,
if assignment of employees to factor categories di¤ers systematically across regions  e.g. if all
industries in a region report non-production workers as production workers our methodology, and
other techniques, will register a spuriousrejection of RFPE. While misclassication between non-
production and production factor categories may occur, it is likely to be less severe than variation
in unobserved factor quality or composition within categories. Furthermore, it is also unlikely that
such misclassication would be along regional rather than industry lines.
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analysis goes through for any number of skill types. For notational convenience,
we suppress region and industry subscripts throughout this section.
Assume the quality-adjusted ow of skilled labor services is a constant returns
to scale function of the quality-adjusted ow of labor services supplied by managers
and engineers:
S = (S1; S2) (23)
= 
 
S1
(eS1 + eS2) ; S2(eS1 + eS2)
!
(eS1 + eS2)
= 
 
S1en1; S2en2 eS;
where S is quality-adjusted skilled labor services, S1 is quality-adjusted manager
labor services, S2 is quality-adjusted engineer labor services, () is assumed to be
linearly homogenous of degree one, eS = eS1 + eS2 is the observed number of skilled
workers, S1 is the quality of managers, S2 is the quality of engineers, and en1 anden2 are observed shares of engineers and managers in skilled employment. Equation
(23) may be re-written more compactly as:
S = eSS ; S    S1en1; S2en2 (24)
where the term for the unobserved quality of skilled workers (S) now captures the
quality of managers, the quality of engineers, and the composition of skilled workers
between managers and engineers.
The quality-adjusted wage of skilled workers is now a price index, dened as the
dual to equation (23):
wS =  (!1; !2) (25)
where !1 is the quality-adjusted wage of managers and !2 is the quality-adjusted
wage of engineers.
Expenditure on quality-adjusted skilled worker services is equal to observed ex-
penditure on skilled workers:
wSS = ewS eS (26)
where wS is the price index dened above and ewS is the observed wage per skilled
worker. It follows that the quality-adjusted skilled worker price index and the
observed skilled worker wage are related according to:
wS = ewS=S ; S    S1en1; S2en2 : (27)
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It is clear from equations (24) and (27) that the factor composition term enters in
exactly the same way as factor quality and the derivation of the relative factor price
test remains unchanged. Under the null hypothesis that quality-adjusted relative
wages are equalized across regions, the ratio of the observed wagebills of skilled and
unskilled workers must be equalized across regions. Thus, as well as allowing for
variation in factor quality, the wagebill test also controls for di¤erences in factor
composition that are specic to regions and industries.
3. Econometric Specication
In Section 2 we showed that under the null of RFPE the ratio of the skilled
workerswagebill to the unskilled workerswagebill is the same across regions within
an industry. This implies that, for an industry j, each regions relative wagebill
equals the value for any base region b and, in particular, for the United States as a
whole,
w^agebill
S
rj
w^agebill
U
rj
=
w^agebill
S
bj
w^agebill
U
bj
=
w^agebill
S
USj
w^agebill
U
USj
: (28)
The simplest test of the null hypothesis is therefore to regress the log of the ratio of
wagebills for region r relative to the ratio for the U.S. on a set of region dummies,
ln
 
RWBSUrj
RWBSUUSj
!
=
X
r
SUr dr + "
SU
rj (29)
where RWBSUrj denotes the relative wagebill in industry j and region r for skilled
workers and unskilled workers (RWBSUrj = wagebill
S
rj = wagebill
U
rj); RWB
SU
USj is the
corresponding relative wagebill for the U.S. as a whole; and the SUr correspond
to the coe¢ cients on the regional dummies dr. Note that we exclude the own
region r when dening the relative wagebill for the U.S. as a whole. Under the null
hypothesis of RFPE, SUr = 0 for all regions and factor pairs, and a test of whether
the SUr are jointly equal to zero therefore provides a test of RFPE.
The regression in equation (29) corresponds to a di¤erences in means test. We
choose the aggregate U.S. as a base region and test RFPE by comparing the relative
wagebill for an industry j across all regions r to the value for the aggregate U.S. in
the same industry.
We also test RFPE by allowing individual regions to be the base region. That is,
we begin by choosing a region b to be the base (where SUb = 1) and run a regression
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analogous to equation (29),
ln
 
RWBSUrj
RWBSUbj
!
=
X
r
SUrb dr + "
SU
rbj : (30)
A test of whether the SUrb are jointly equal to zero provides a test of the null
hypothesis of RFPE. Rejecting SUrb = 0 is su¢ cient to reject the null hypothesis
of RFPE, and any pair of regions r and r0 face the same relative factor prices if
SUrb = 
SU
r0b . To avoid problems with the choice of the base region, we estimate
equation (30) for all possible choices of base region b.
Although regions have the same relative wagebills under the null hypothesis of
RFPE (hence SUrb = 0), the theoretical analysis of Section 2 suggests that, under
the alternative hypothesis, the coe¢ cients on the regional dummies (SUrb in equation
14 and SUrb in equations 29 and 30) may vary across industries. With a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) production technology, this cross-industry variation
is associated with di¤erent elasticities of substitution between skilled and unskilled
workers (equation 16).
We have no strong priors on the industry variation in the elasticity of substi-
tution between di¤erent types of labor or in other features of the operator  j in
the cost function (equation 3), and therefore we pool observations across industries.
Since under the null hypothesis, SUrbj = 0, holds for all industries j, a nding of sta-
tistically signicant coe¢ cients on the regional dummies when pooling observations
is su¢ cient to reject RFPE.
Our test for relative factor price di¤erences holds for any constant returns to
scale production technology. However, if we are willing to assume a CES production
technology and choose a value for the elasticity of substitution , the estimated
coe¢ cients on the regional dummies may be used to derive implied quality-adjusted
relative wages and unobserved factor quality across regions via equation (16). We
make this assumption in interpreting our empirical results below.
Note that equations (29) and (30) compare the relative wagebill for skilled and
unskilled workers in region r to the value in a base region within each industry
j. This is a di¤erence in di¤erences specication with a number of attractive
statistical properties. Any industry-specic determinant of relative wagebills that
is common across regions is di¤erenced-outwhen we normalize relative to the base
region on the left-hand side of the equations (for example, features of the production
technology, compensating di¤erentials across industries, other inter-industry wage
di¤erentials, and industry-specic labor market institutions such as the degree of
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unionization). The analysis thus explicitly controls for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in the determinants of relative wagebills across industries.
Similarly, in both region r and the base region we analyze the wagebill of skilled
workers relative to unskilled workers. Therefore, any region-specic determinant of
wagebills that is common to both skilled and production workers is di¤erenced-out
when we construct a regions relative wagebill (RWBSUrj = wagebill
S
rj = wagebill
U
rj).
Here potential examples include neutral regional technology di¤erences and compen-
sating di¤erentials across regions that are common to skilled and unskilled workers,
e.g. region-specic di¤erences in the cost of living.
4. Empirical Implementation
In this section we apply our methodology to test for relative factor price equality
across 181 U.S. labor markets in 1972 and 1992.
4.1. Data
We examine wagebills across the 181 Labor Market Areas (LMAs) that make up
the continental United States (Alaska and Hawaii are excluded). LMAs, constructed
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, are aggregations of counties that are based
on commuting patterns and therefore correspond closely to the concept of regional
labor markets where wages are determined (see Johnson and Spatz 1993 for more
detail). LMAs are permitted to cross state lines, and more than one labor market
may appear in each state. As a result, LMAs provide greater resolution of relative
factor price variation than more aggregate geographic units such as states or Census
regions.18
Data on total payments to production (unskilled) and non-production (skilled)
workers for 1972 and 1992 by industry and labor market area are obtained from the
Censuses of Manufactures in the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) collected
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.19 We exclude four-digit Standard Industrial
18A number of studies (e.g. Topel 1986; Lee 1999, Bound and Holzer 2000, Hanson and Slaughter
2002, and Bernard and Jensen 2000) document variation in income inequality or wages across either
the nine U.S. Census regions or across U.S. states. Related work using wage regressions by Heckman
et al. (1996) nds that worker characteristics are priced di¤erently across U.S. Census regions.
19Our sample covers all manufacturing establishments in the continental United States for which
information on production and non-production workers is available. This sample excludes very
small plants that do not report information on their inputs. Other data sources, such as the
Decennial Census, collect more detailed information on worker wages and observed characteristics
than does the LRD. However, these surveys generally record the industry of the worker at a very
aggregate level of activity. Furthermore, sampling in these datasets does not ensure proportional
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Classication (SIC4) industries that explicitly include miscellaneous products (i.e.,
SIC4 codes ending in 9) in order to base our examination on industries that are
more likely to include comparable products.20 This pruning leaves us with 401 of
the original 458 SIC4 industries covering 88 percent of manufacturing output and
86 percent of manufacturing employment.
Though use of the non-production production distinction to classify workers
as skilled and unskilled is imperfect, this imperfection is mitigated here by our
methodologys robustness to unobserved di¤erences in region-industry factor quality
and composition.
4.2. Testing RFPE
Table 1 reports the results of testing for relative factor price equality across
LMAs using the U.S. average as the base region (equation 29). The data easily
reject the null hypothesis of RFPE across regions within the United States for both
1972 and for 1992.21 In 1972, 37 (55) regions have relative wagebills signicantly
di¤erent from the U.S. average at the 5 (10) percent level of signicance. In 1992,
64 regions reject at the 5 percent level and 74 at the 10 percent level.
The relative wagebill results in Table 1 can be used to estimate relative skilled
wage di¤erences in individual labor markets by assuming CES production, as noted
in equations (15) and (16) above. Nashville and New York City, for example, have
signicantly di¤erent relative wagebills for non-production and production workers,
and thus signicantly di¤erent relative wages. In 1972 the average relative wagebill
across all industries in Nashville is 10 percent below the U.S. average while that for
New York is 15 percent above. Twenty years later, the gap between the two labor
markets had widened to 34 percent. Assuming CES production technologies and
an elasticity of substitution of 2 between production and non-production workers
(i.e.  = 0:5) in both years, these wagebill di¤erences imply that quality-adjusted
relative wages were 1.30 and 1.36 times higher in Nashville than in New York in 1972
representation by region-industry limiting their usefulness for testing relative factor price equality.
20Spuriousrejection of RFPE is possible if industries are comprised of heterogeneous products
and regions systematically specialize in certain products within industries. Suppose that relative
factor prices are equal across all regions and that products vary in terms of skill intensity within
all industries. If a region systematically produces skill-intensive products in every industry, its
relative wagebill would be larger than the average for the country even if relative factor prices are
identical across regions. We have attempted to mitigate the role of intra-industry heterogeneity
by exploiting the highly disaggregate, four-digit SIC industry information available in the LRD.
These industries are the most detailed industry data available for our sample period.
21The hypothesis that all the LMA coe¢ cients are equal to zero is rejected at the 1 percent level
in both 1972 and 1992.
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and 1992, respectively.22 In both periods, skilled workers in skill-scarce Nashville
received higher relative wages than skilled workers in skill-abundant New York.23
We assign LMAs to factor-price cohorts based on the sign and signicance (at
the 10 percent level) of coe¢ cients reported in Table 1. Figures 1 and 2 display the
distribution of regions across cohorts for 1972 and 1992, respectively. Regions with
relative skilled wagebills that are signicantly higher than those for the aggregate
United States are grouped in cohort A (black shading), while those with relative
skilled wagebills that signicantly lower are assigned to cohort C (cross-hatching).
The remaining labor markets, with relative skilled wagebills that are not signicantly
di¤erent from the U.S. as a whole, are placed in cohort B. Regions in cohort A have
higher relative wagebills and thus lower relative wages for skilled workers, while
regions in cohort C have higher relative wages for skilled workers. New York,
with a relatively low skilled wage is in cohort A and shaded black, while Nashville,
with a relatively high skilled wage, is in cohort C and cross-hatched. Using the
same assumption about the elasticity of substitution between factors as above, we
estimate the average quality-adjusted relative skilled wage to be 11 percent higher
and 21 percent lower than the national average in cohorts C and A, respectively, in
1972. The comparable percentages for 1992 are, respectively, 10 percent higher for
C and 16 percent lower for A.
As indicated in Table 1 and highlighted in Figures 1 and 2, there is substantial
movement of labor markets across cohorts between 1972 and 1992. In 1972 there
are 9, 126, and 46 labor markets in the A, B and C cohorts, respectively. The
corresponding gures are 16, 107 and 58 for 1992. Twenty-seven labor markets
jump to a higher relative wagebill cohort over the sample period, while 34 regions
drop to a lower relative wagebill cohort. These movements suggest an evolution
of U.S. labor markets into extreme relative wage cohorts over time, a somewhat
surprising result given the usual assumption that U.S. labor markets are becoming
more tightly integrated and thus more likely to exhibit the same relative wages.
Our second specication for testing for relative factor price equality is the com-
plete set of bivariate regressions captured by equation (30). Because there are far
too many coe¢ cients to report (32,580 per year when every region is used as a base),
we report a summary of rejections in Table 2.24 In 1972, 19 percent of the region-
22An elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers greater than unity is consis-
tent with empirical estimates in the labor literature (Katz and Autor 1999).
23A lower relative wage for skilled workers in New York does not mean that the absolute level of
wages is lower.
24Disclosure of individual coe¢ cients from Table 2 is also not possible under Title XIII of the
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pairs reject relative factor price equality at the 10 percent level, while 13 percent
reject at the 5 percent level. Every region rejects with at least 3 other regions. In
1992, 24 percent of the region pairs reject relative factor price equality at the 10
percent level, 17 percent reject at the 5 percent level. Every region rejects with at
least 3 other regions.
Both specications provide strong evidence against the hypothesis that all re-
gions in the United States face the same relative factor prices in either 1972 or 1992.
The results show both that labor markets in the U.S. vary signicantly in terms
of relative wages, and that relative wages are lower in areas with large quantities
of skilled workers. In the next section we explore the link between relative wage
variation and industry structure.
5. RFPE and Industry Specialization
In this section we examine the link between labor marketsindustry structure and
the relative wage variation found above. Establishment of such a link highlights the
importance of our nding of a breakdown of factor price equality because variation
in region industry structure may be a key reason for divergence of regional outcomes
over time. This link also provides insight into possible theoretical explanations of
the failure of factor price equality, which we explore in Section 6..
Table 3 summarizes industry overlap among labor markets. The rst two rows
report the minimum, median and maximum percent of regions per industry, i.e., the
breadth of industry production across regions. The median industry is produced in
34 percent of regions in 1992, up from 28 percent of regions in 1972. As indicated
in the nal column, some industries, like cement, are produced in every region.
The middle two rows of the table report the minimum, median and maximum
percent of industries per region, i.e., the variety of industrial production within
regions. No region produces all industries in either year; the most diverseregion
manufactures 84 percent of all industries in 1972 and 86 percent in 1992. The
median region increases its scope from 13 to 20 percent of all industries between
1972 and 1992.
The nal two rows of Table 3 characterize the extent of bilateral industry overlap
among regions. The percent of industries that two regions have in common is
dened as the number of industries produced in both regions divided by the number
of industries produced in the region with the larger number of industries. As
Bureau of Census.
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indicated in the table, no two regions produce the same set of industries, though
the extent of overlap increases with time.
We now test whether larger di¤erences in relative skilled wages across labor
markets are associated with smaller overlaps in the industries they produce, both in
cross-section and over time.
5.1. Industry Mix Across Regions
We gauge whether the overlap in industry mix between two regions falls with
di¤erences in their relative factor prices by running an OLS regression of the number
of industries two regions have in common on the distance between regionsrelative
wagebills,
COMMONrb = 0 + 1jSUrb j+ rIr + bIb + rb; (31)
where jSUrb j is the absolute value of the regression coe¢ cient from equation (30),
COMMONrb is the number of industries that regions r and b produce in common,
and Ir and Ib are the number of industries produced by region r and b, respectively.25
Separate estimation results for 1972 and 1992 are reported in Table 4. These results
indicate that regions with more dissimilar wagebill ratios have fewer industries in
common. The point estimates suggest that a pair of regions with the maximum
estimated di¤erences in relative wages would have 17 and 28 fewer industries in
common in 1972 and 1992, respectively. Two regions with the median number of
industries would have few, if any, regions in common if they exhibited the maximum
di¤erences in relative wages in each year.26
5.2. Industry Mix Over Time
If relative wage di¤erences are important for rms seeking to minimize costs,
regions experiencing larger changes in their relative wages over time should display
greater churning of their industry mix in terms of adding and dropping industries.
To check this relationship, we run an OLS regression of the form,
CHURNr = + d
SUr;92   SUr;72+ r; (32)
where the dependent variable, CHURNr, is the percent of industries either added
or dropped by region r between 1972 and 1992 relative to its number of industries in
25All our estimates to this point have been based on industries that exist in both regions.
26Regional product mixes may not be mutually exclusive because some goods with very high
transport costs, such as cement, are essentially untradeable.
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1972, and
SUr;92   SUr;72 is the absolute value of the change in region rs wagebill ratio
relative to the U.S. between 1972 and 1992 (Table 1). These changes range from
0.005 to 0.6 with a median of 0.07. Results are reported in Table 5. They indicate
that industry churning and changes in estimated wagebill ratios are positively and
signicantly correlated. The implied value of CHURNr for the median change in
relative wagebill ratios is 7.5 percentage points.
Together, the results of Tables 4 and 5 indicate that changes in relative wagebills
are associated with varying industry mix both across regions and over time. These
relationships suggest that regions have di¤erential exposure to industry-specic
shocks and that these asymmetric shocks will have uneven e¤ects on regional la-
bor markets.
6. Theoretical Explanations for the Failure of RFPE
In this section we discuss several potential explanations for our results. Neo-
classical trade theory and spatial variation in relative costs of living appear to be
the most likely. Alternate explanations based on region-industry productivity dif-
ferences, increasing returns to scale and variation in industry prices across regions
have additional implications that appear implausible.
6.1. Neoclassical Trade Theory
Our ndings rejection of factor price equality across U.S. labor markets, lower
estimated relative wages for skilled workers in skill-abundant regions, and a negative
relationship between relative wage di¤erences and industry overlap are consistent
with a regional interpretation of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of neoclassical trade the-
ory. Under this framework, inter-regional factor immobility prevents endowment-
driven variation in labor markets relative factor rewards from being arbitraged
away. Regions specialize in industries according to comparative advantage, with
skill-abundant countries having relatively low skilled wages producing skill-intensive
goods while skill-scarce countries exhibiting relatively high skilled wages manufac-
ture more labor-intensive products. Rejection of factor price equality across U.S.
labor markets indicates U.S. factor mobility may be insu¢ cient to even out dispar-
ities in regional relative factor endowments.
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6.2. Spatial Variation in Nominal Wages
Relative wage di¤erences in the neoclassical model are supported by factor im-
mobility. However, even in the presence of perfect labor mobility, nominal relative
wages may not be identical and RFPE may be rejected  if the relative cost of
living for skilled and unskilled workers diverges across regions.27
If this variation in relative consumer price indexes is su¢ cient, real consumption
wages will be equal across regions even if nominal wages are not, providing workers
no incentive to relocate. Note that, even in this case, industry participation will vary
across regions because the location of production responds to producer prices and
(nominal) factor prices faced by the rm rather than to real consumption wages.
This variation in industrial structure means that regions again have di¤erential
exposure to industry-specic shocks, though factor mobility may now play a role in
transmitting these shocks across regions.
For spatial variation in relative consumer price indexes to be consistent with our
empirical ndings, the cost of living for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers
must vary substantially across regions and must be lower in skill-abundant regions.
In addition, the regional disparity in relative costs of living must also increase be-
tween 1972 and 1992. The data required to test this additional implication would
have to track the relative cost of living for production and non-production workers
across LMAs over time.
6.3. Region-Industry Productivity Di¤erences
Region-industry variation in total factor productivity may induce a rejection of
relative factor price equality. In general equilibrium, if technology is not common
across regions and varies di¤erentially across industries, relative factor prices will
vary so long as there is geographical immobility in at least one factor. However,
to explain our empirical nding of a lower quality-adjusted skill premium in rela-
tively skill-abundant regions, technical e¢ ciency would have to be systematically
relatively high in low-skill intensive industries within high-skill abundant regions.
The intuition for why this relationship is necessary is that an increase in the techni-
cal e¢ ciency of low-skill industries acts like an increase in their relative price. Such
a price increase reduces the quality-adjusted skill premium and motivates a switch
toward more skill-intensive techniques in both sectors.
27Divergence in the relative cost of living for skilled and unskilled workers across regions may be
due to price di¤erences associated with non-tradeables or region-specic amenities that are valued
di¤erentially by skilled and unskilled workers.
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Though this explanation is theoretically possible, relatively low technical e¢ -
ciency in skill-intensive industries within skill-abundant regions appears unlikely.
Indeed, consideration of knowledge spillovers and external economies of scale sug-
gest that technical e¢ ciency would be relatively higher in skill-intensive industries
located in skill-abundant regions.
6.4. Increasing Returns to Scale
Increasing returns to scale, either internal or external, can also motivate a re-
jection of relative factor price equality. To match the skill premia we observe,
increasing returns to scale must reduce the relative (average) costs of production
of low-skill industries in high-skill regions. This region variation in scale economies
would raise the relative demand for low-skill workers (in the skill-abundant regions)
and reduce the skill premium. Since output is typically larger in high-skill industries
in high-skill regions, this explanation again appears implausible.
6.5. Variation in Industry Prices Across Regions
The null hypothesis of relative factor price equality may also be rejected if relative
industry prices vary across regions. To match our results, the relative price of high-
skill industries would have to be lower in skill-abundant regions. This sort of goods
price variation is in fact an implication of Heckscher-Ohlin models that assume costly
trade between regions in addition to factor immobility. Factor rewards diverge in
these models for the same reason given above, namely di¤erences in underlying
factor endowments, though this divergence may be more extreme if trade costs lead
to variation in relative goods prices.
7. Conclusions
This paper develops a methodology for testing whether factor prices are equal
across geographic regions. It is based on cost minimization by rms and invokes
only general assumptions about production, markets and factors. In particular, the
method can identify departures from relative factor price equality in the presence
of unobserved industry and factor heterogeneity that is likely to be present in any
cross-country or cross-region sample, including unobserved variations in production
techniques across industries, unobserved Hicks-neutral region-industry productiv-
ity di¤erences, unobserved region-industry factor quality di¤erences, unobserved
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region-industry variation in factor composition, and unobserved di¤erences in re-
gional consumer price indices. The test is relatively easy to implement in that it
requires data only on the total payments to factors (e.g. wagebills) by industry and
region.
We use our methodology to test for relative factor price equality across 181 U.S.
labor markets areas in 1972 and 1992. The data reject the null hypothesis that all
regions o¤er the same relative factor prices in both years. Results indicate sub-
stantial relative wage variation across skill-scarce and skill-abundant labor markets.
We also nd that relative wage di¤erences have real economic impact: the greater
the di¤erence in relative wages across a region pair, the greater the di¤erence in the
pairs industry structure. This relationship is also evident within regions across
time: regions experiencing larger changes in relative wages between 1972 and 1992
undergo larger changes in the set of industries they produce.
The association we nd between regionsrelative wages and their industry struc-
ture suggests U.S. labor markets may be asymmetrically exposed to domestic and
external shocks. Further examination of this link may shed light on several liter-
atures in economics, including the ability of skill-scarce regions to catch up with
skill-abundant regions, the impact of trade liberalization on U.S. relative wages,
and the e¤ects of asymmetric shocks in optimum currency areas. Our nding of
substantial relative wage variation across labor markets also suggests that use of
industry production functions to estimate country-level productivity may need to
be modied to account for regional heterogeneity.
Finally, we note that our approach to characterizing factor price inequality might
usefully be applied to other settings where unobserved variation in quality is an
important problem for identication. A similar test based on consumer expenditure
minimization, for example, could be developed to test the law of one price across
geographic areas.
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A Appendix A: Absolute Factor Price Equalization (AFPE)
This appendix develops a test for absolute factor price equality that controls for
unobserved factor quality. Like our test for relative factor price equality, it makes
use of the result that factor quality terms cancel when observed wages and observed
employment levels are multiplied.
To test absolute factor price equalization (AFPE) we analyze variation across
regions in the share of total payments to a factor of production in output. Though
our demonstration here is for skilled workers, the analysis for other factors of pro-
duction is analogous. Observed employment of skilled workers may be obtained
from equations (4) and (2). Multiplying observed employment by observed wages
and dividing by output, we obtain,
~wSrj
eSrj
Yrj
=
wSr Srj
Yrj
= wSr A
 1
rj
@ j()
@wSr
: (33)
Under the null hypothesis of AFPE, quality-adjusted wages are equal across regions
(wSr = w
S
b ) and observed wages vary in direct proportion to unobserved factor quality
( ~wSrj = 
S
rjw
S
b ), where we again choose region b as a reference region so that bj =
1 8j. The equality of the absolute level of factor prices requires identical production
technologies across regions and industries (Arj = Abj). Using this relationship in
equation (33), it follows that, under the null hypothesis of AFPE, factor shares are
equalized across regions,
(H0 : AFPE);
wSr Srj
Yrj
=
wSb Sbj
Ybj
: (34)
Under the alternative hypothesis of non-AFPE, technical e¢ ciency may vary across
region-industry pairs and regions may be characterized by di¤erent equilibrium fac-
tor prices. In this case, from equation (34), factor shares in the two regions are
related as follows:
(H1 : non-AFPE);
wSr Srj
Yrj
= Srb

Abj
Arj

@ j()=@wSr
@ j()=@wSb

wSb Sbj
Ybj

: (35)
Together, equations (34) and (35) provide the basis for a test of the null hypothesis
of AFPE, with AFPE implying a testable parameter restriction in equation (35).
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1972
A CB
Figure 1: Labor Market Areas and Relative Wagebill Groups - 1972
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1992
A CB
Figure 2: Labor Market Areas and Relative Wagebill Groups - 1992
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LMA Region LMA Region LMA Region
1 Bangor, ME -0.10 0.07 62 Parkersburg, WV 0.17 -0.11 123 Austin, TX 0.12 0.11 *
2 Portland, ME 0.02 0.07 63 Wheeling, WV -0.18 * -0.13 124 Waco, TX 0.09 -0.10
3 Burlington, VT -0.08 -0.04 64 Youngstown, OH -0.07 -0.05 125 Dallas, TX 0.03 0.03
4 Boston, MA 0.10 *** 0.16 *** 65 Cleveland, OH 0.07 * -0.03 126 Wichita falls, TX -0.08 0.09
5 Providence, RI 0.12 ** 0.11 ** 66 Columbus, OH -0.10 ** -0.07 127 Abilene, TX 0.05 0.01
6 Hartford, CT 0.13 *** 0.10 *** 67 Cincinnati, OH 0.02 0.13 *** 128 San angelo, TX -0.42 * 0.23
7 Albany, NY 0.01 -0.02 68 Dayton, OH -0.04 -0.01 129 San antonio, TX 0.02 -0.03
8 Syracuse, NY -0.12 ** -0.03 69 Lima, OH -0.11 -0.26 *** 130 Corpus christi, TX -0.11 0.13
9 Rochester, NY 0.06 0.05 70 Toledo, OH -0.06 -0.08 131 Brownsville, TX -0.11 -0.10
10 Buffalo, NY -0.06 -0.05 71 Detroit, MI 0.03 0.08 ** 132 Odessa, TX 0.10 -0.01
11 Binghamton, NY -0.17 *** -0.12 * 72 Saginaw, MI -0.06 0.05 133 El paso, TX -0.12 -0.03
12 New york, NY 0.15 *** 0.17 *** 73 Grand rapids, MI 0.02 0.07 134 Lubbock, TX -0.02 0.07
13 Scranton, PA -0.26 *** -0.18 *** 74 Lansing, MI -0.04 -0.07 135 Amarillo, TX -0.11 -0.24 **
14 Williamsport, PA -0.19 *** -0.13 ** 75 South bend, IN -0.01 -0.08 136 Lawton, OK -0.30 * -0.36 **
15 Erie, PA 0.02 -0.02 76 Fort wayne, IN -0.05 -0.06 137 Oklahoma city, OK -0.03 -0.13 **
16 Pittsburgh, PA -0.12 *** -0.11 *** 77 Kokomo, IN 0.04 0.00 138 Tulsa, OK -0.07 -0.11 **
17 Harrisburg, PA -0.09 ** -0.23 *** 78 Anderson, IN -0.11 -0.06 139 Wichita, KS -0.02 -0.07
18 Philadelphia, PA -0.03 0.05 79 Indianapolis, IN 0.01 -0.03 140 Salina, KS -0.28 ** -0.03
19 Baltimore, MD 0.04 0.02 80 Evansville, IN -0.11 * -0.21 *** 141 Topeka, KS -0.09 -0.07
20 Washington, DC 0.01 -0.05 81 Terre haute, IN 0.07 -0.22 * 142 Lincoln, NE -0.14 -0.20 **
21 Roanoke, VA -0.14 ** -0.18 *** 82 Lafayette, IN -0.32 *** -0.26 ** 143 Omaha, NE -0.01 -0.14 **
22 Richmond, VA -0.06 -0.14 ** 83 Chicago, IL 0.08 ** 0.09 *** 144 Grand island, NE -0.13 -0.31 ***
23 Norfolk, VA -0.12 0.11 84 Champaign, IL -0.12 -0.03 145 Scottsbluff, NE -0.36 * -0.05
24 Rocky mount, NC -0.13 * -0.06 85 Springfield, IL 0.06 -0.08 146 Rapid city, SD 0.25 -0.02
25 Wilmington, NC -0.03 -0.25 *** 86 Quincy, IL -0.25 * -0.31 ** 147 Sioux falls, SD -0.01 -0.11
26 Fayetteville, NC 0.00 -0.20 ** 87 Peoria, IL -0.11 0.05 148 Aberdeen, SD -0.15 -0.18
27 Raleigh, NC 0.03 -0.04 88 Rockford, IL -0.05 0.00 149 Fargo, ND -0.05 0.02
28 Greensboro, NC 0.01 -0.10 ** 89 Milwaukee, WI 0.03 0.08 ** 150 Grand forks, ND 0.03 -0.17
29 Charlotte, NC -0.01 -0.01 90 Madison, WI -0.24 *** -0.09 151 Bismarck, ND 0.01 0.19
30 Asheville, NC -0.23 *** -0.15 ** 91 La crosse, WI 0.18 * 0.11 152 Minot, ND 0.19 0.04
31 Greenville, SC 0.00 0.00 92 Eau claire, WI -0.27 ** -0.28 *** 153 Great falls, MT -0.17 0.10
32 Columbia, SC 0.02 0.03 93 Wausau, WI -0.05 -0.11 154 Missoula, MT -0.39 *** -0.12
33 Florence, SC -0.11 -0.11 94 Appleton, WI 0.01 0.00 155 Billings, MT 0.03 -0.03
34 Charleston, SC 0.20 -0.04 95 Duluth, MN -0.07 -0.17 * 156 Cheyenne, WY -0.21 -0.03
35 Augusta, GA 0.03 -0.01 96 Minneapolis, MN 0.04 0.11 *** 157 Denver, CO 0.03 0.20 ***
36 Atlanta, GA -0.02 -0.09 ** 97 Rochester, MN 0.01 -0.16 158 Colorado springs, CO -0.17 * -0.12
37 Columbus, GA 0.18 ** -0.02 98 Dubuque, IA -0.05 -0.39 *** 159 Grand junction, CO -0.06 0.04
38 Macon, GA -0.09 -0.24 *** 99 Davenport, IL -0.06 -0.15 ** 160 Albuquerque, NM 0.00 -0.05
39 Savannah, GA 0.00 -0.02 100 Cedar rapids, IA -0.02 0.02 161 Tucson, AZ -0.16 0.10
40 Albany, GA -0.10 -0.10 101 Waterloo, IA -0.07 -0.24 *** 162 Phoenix, AZ -0.11 * -0.02
41 Jacksonville, FL -0.12 ** 0.01 102 Fort dodge, IA 0.01 0.07 163 Las vegas, NV -0.19 -0.12
42 Orlando, FL 0.08 0.06 103 Sioux city, IA 0.07 -0.26 *** 164 Reno, NV -0.16 0.04
43 Miami, FL 0.05 0.06 104 Des moines, IA -0.16 ** -0.06 165 Salt lake city, UT -0.11 * -0.09 *
44 Tampa, FL -0.04 0.14 *** 105 Kansas city, MO -0.02 0.02 166 Pocatello, ID 0.00 -0.16 *
45 Tallahassee, FL 0.09 -0.11 106 Columbia, MO -0.20 * -0.25 *** 167 Boise city, ID -0.14 -0.22 **
46 Pensacola, FL -0.03 0.00 107 St. louis, MO -0.04 -0.03 168 Spokane, WA -0.02 -0.02
47 Mobile, AL -0.08 -0.05 108 Springfield, MO -0.15 *** -0.17 *** 169 Richland, WA -0.14 -0.16
48 Montgomery, AL -0.08 -0.11 * 109 Fayetteville, AR -0.33 *** -0.13 170 Yakima, WA -0.26 ** -0.12
49 Birmingham, AL -0.10 ** -0.11 ** 110 Fort smith, AR -0.17 * -0.17 ** 171 Seattle, WA -0.08 * 0.07 *
50 Huntsville, AL -0.13 * -0.19 *** 111 Little rock, AR -0.26 *** -0.15 *** 172 Portland, OR 0.00 -0.02
51 Chattanooga, TN -0.11 * -0.14 *** 112 Jackson, MS -0.14 ** -0.13 ** 173 Eugene, OR -0.14 -0.01
52 Johnson city, TN -0.11 -0.20 *** 113 New orleans, LA 0.03 -0.04 174 Redding, CA -0.23 -0.23 *
53 Knoxville, TN 0.01 -0.14 *** 114 Baton rouge, LA 0.03 -0.05 175 Eureka, CA -0.11 -0.07
54 Nashville, TN -0.10 ** -0.17 *** 115 Lafayette, LA -0.07 -0.25 *** 176 San francisco, CA 0.00 0.19 ***
55 Memphis, TN -0.08 * -0.20 *** 116 Lake charles, LA -0.04 -0.19 177 Sacramento, CA -0.07 0.04
56 Paducah, KY -0.16 -0.29 ** 117 Shreveport, LA -0.01 -0.17 ** 178 Stockton, CA -0.37 *** -0.09
57 Louisville, KY -0.12 ** -0.10 * 118 Monroe, LA -0.05 -0.20 ** 179 Fresno, CA -0.18 *** -0.06
58 Lexington, KY -0.18 ** -0.14 ** 119 Texarkana, TX -0.23 ** -0.25 *** 180 Los angeles, CA 0.09 *** 0.15 ***
59 Huntington, WV -0.08 -0.34 *** 120 Tyler, TX -0.17 ** -0.23 *** 181 San diego, CA 0.04 0.18 ***
60 Charleston, WV -0.18 * -0.09 121 Beaumont, TX -0.08 -0.27 **
61 Morgantown, WV -0.12 -0.14 122 Houston, TX 0.06 0.04
*Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level.
1972 1992 1972 1992 1972 1992
Table 1: Coe¢ cients of Regression of Region Relative Wagebill on US Average
Relative Wagebill
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1972 1992
Percent of Region Pairs
Rejecting at 5% Level 13 17
Percent of Region Pairs
Rejecting at 10% Level 19 24
Minimum Rejections 3 3
Mean Rejections 35 42
Maximum Rejections 116 128
Notes:  Table summarizes rejections of relative
factor price equality from estimation of equation
30.
Table 2: Summary of Bilateral Region-Pair RFPEQ Rejections from Estimation of
Equation 18
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Year Minimum Median Maximum
1972 1 28 100
1992 3 34 100
1972 2 13 84
1992 2 20 86
1972 5 32 94
1992 6 34 93
Regions Per Industry
as a Percent of All
Regions
Industries per Region
as a Percent of All
Industries
Bilateral Overlap as a
Percent of the Larger
Region's Industries
Table 3: Overlap of Four-Digit SIC Industries Across US Labor Market Areas
1972 1992
Relative Wagebill Disparity -12.9 -23.1
-0.8 -1.3
Industries in Region r 0.2 0.3
-0.003 -0.003
Industries in Region s 0.3 0.3
-0.004 -0.004
Constant -4.9 -13.3
-0.4 -0.5
Observations 16,290 16,290
R2 0.68 0.75
Notes: OLS regression results. Dependent variable is number of
industries produced in common by regions r and s. Robust
standard errors noted below each coefficient.
Number of Industries Common to
Regions r and s
Table 4: Regional Industry Overlap As a Function of Relative Wagebill Disparity
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Churnr
|1972 to 1992 Change in Wagebill Ratio | 107.6
-33.3
Constant 79.5
-4.4
Observations 181
R2 0.06
Notes: OLS regression results of changes in region industry
structure on changes in relative wagebill ratio over time.
Dependent variable is the percent of industries added or
dropped by region r between 1972 and 1992 relative to its
number of industries in 1972. The first idependent variable is
the absolute value of the change in region r's wagebill ratio
relative to the U.S. between 1972 and 1992 (i.e., the
coefficients listed in Table 3). Robust standard errors noted
below each coefficient.
Table 5: Industry Churning versus Relative Wagebill Changes, 1992 versus 1972
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